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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 09-3486 
_____________ 
 
GEORGE LOMBARDI,  
 
                          Appellant 
                                        
v. 
 
VICTORIA WINGO; 
WILBUR B. SUFFECOL; 
COMMISSIONER OF FINANCE OF THE 
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS 
 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court 
of the United States Virgin Islands,  
Division of St. Croix, Appellate Division 
(Civ. No. 1-02-cv-00153) 
 
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
Monday, December 13, 2010 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed: January 24, 2011) 
 
__________ 
 
OPINION 
       _________ 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
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 Appellant George Lombardi appeals the memorandum and order entered July 28, 
2009 by the District Court of the United States Virgin Islands, Appellate Division.  For 
the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we will recite only the facts and 
procedural history that are necessary for the disposition of this case.   
Lombardi filed this appeal after the Appellate Division remanded the case to the 
Superior Court. That remand was with the instructions that, “subject to applicable law 
concerning the accrual of interest pending appeal, interest be awarded at the statutory rate 
of 4%, from September 6, 2002 the date that judgment was certified as final and 
appealable.”  Lombardi v. Wingo, No. 2002-0153 (D.V.I. filed July 28, 2009), available 
at App. 188-209, 202.  
 On appeal, Lombardi argues that it was error for the Superior Court: (1) to order 
him to provide Plaintiffs with restitution in the amount of the $19,000 purchase price they 
paid to him for the property;
1
 (2) to deny his claim for indemnification and/or 
contribution from the Commissioner of Finance for the $19,000; (3) to order the 
Commissioner of Finance to return the purchase price for the property without providing 
interest from the date of sale of the property to the date of this decision; (4) to deny 
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 Lombardi also argues that if we agree with him that Plaintiffs were not entitled to 
reimbursement of the $19,000, we should find that Plaintiffs are entitled to 
reimbursement from the Commissioner of Finance of the money Lombardi paid to 
purchase the property, including interest, and the stamp fees that Lombardi paid to 
transfer the deed to the Wingos. We do not address this argument because we agree with 
the Appellate Division that Plaintiffs were entitled to reimbursement of the $19,000. 
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Lombardi‟s claim against the Commissioner of Finance for repayment of his stamp fees; 
and (5) to deny his request for attorney‟s fees.  The Commissioner of Finance argues that 
we do not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the Appellate Division‟s order 
was not a final order.
2
  We must first determine whether we have jurisdiction before we 
address the merits of this appeal.   
II. 
 According to the Commissioner of Finance, the Appellate Division‟s July 28, 
2009 order was not final (and is therefore not appealable) because the court remanded the 
calculation of post-judgment interest to the Superior Court.  We have jurisdiction over 
final orders of the Appellate Division pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c).  “[O]ur cases 
have uniformly held that 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c) has the same requirements for 
appealability as 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”  Gov’t of V.I. v. Hodge, 359 F.3d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 
2004).  Appeals from the Appellate Division are treated the same as appeals from other 
federal district courts.  Id. at 318.   
A final decision “is one which disposes of the whole subject, gives all the relief 
that was contemplated, provides with reasonable completeness, for giving effect to the 
judgment and leaves nothing to be done in the cause save to superintend, ministerially, 
the execution of the decree.”  Isidor Paiewonsky Assocs., Inc. v. Sharp Props., Inc., 998 
F.2d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 1993).  This court has acknowledged that “it is sometimes 
appropriate that the requirement of finality be given a practical rather than a technical 
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 Additionally, in the alternative, the Commissioner of Finance argues that we should 
affirm the Appellate Division‟s holding that Lombardi was not entitled to indemnification 
and/or contribution from the Commissioner of Finance. 
4 
construction.”  Plymouth Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ill. Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. of Chicago, 
Ill., 378 F.2d 389, 391 (3d Cir. 1967) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
In Government of Virgin Islands  v. Marsham, 293 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2002), 
we held that, although “the Appellate Division technically „remanded‟ the case for 
resentencing, there would be nothing left for the [Superior Court] to do but to execute the 
Appellate Division‟s order.”  Id. at 117.  Therefore, the matter was remanded to the trial 
court “simply for a ministerial entry.”  Id.  Accordingly, we held that the Appellate 
Division‟s order was final and appealable.  Id. 
 Here,  the Appellate Division remanded the case to the Superior Court solely to 
calculate post-judgment interest and with the instruction that interest should be calculated 
at 4% beginning on September 6, 2002.  Thus, as in Marsham, the Appellate Division has 
technically “remanded” the case to the trial court, but on remand the Superior Court has 
nothing to do but execute the Appellate Division‟s order.  Also as in Marsham, the 
Appellate Division‟s remand is purely ministerial and does not affect the disposition of 
the case.  Accordingly, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to hear this case because 
the Appellate Division‟s order was final.3  
                                              
3
 In deciding that the order was final in Marsham, we noted: 
 
If this Court were to rule otherwise, the case would return to the Territorial Court 
to vacate the restitution order. Once vacated, both the Government and Marsham 
would then be required to appeal, again, to the same Appellate Division on the 
same issues that were raised previously before it. The Appellate Division would 
presumably rule the same way, and only then would the parties be permitted to 
appeal to this Court. Such a process would be nothing but an exercise in formalism 
and futility. 
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III. 
 After reviewing the issues presented by Lombardi on appeal, we find them to be 
meritless.  The Appellate Division issued a detailed and thoughtful opinion that carefully 
considered the issues.  We will affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the 
opinions of the Appellate Division and the Superior Court.  See Lombardi v. Wingo, No. 
2002-0153 (D.V.I. filed July 28, 2009), available at App. 188-209; Wingo v. Lombardi, 
No. 946-1992 (V.I. Super. Ct. February 18, 1997), available at App. 5-20; Wingo v. 
Lombardi, No. 946-1992 (V.I. Super. Ct. September 6, 2002), available at App. 21-27. 
 
   
 
  
                                                                                                                                                  
Id. at 117 n.2.  The same concerns exist here.  
 
 
 
 
